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Introduction
In the American system of justice, judges are expected to 
perform their role apart from the “political thicket,” free 
of political pressure and indifferent to public opinion.1 Yet 
today, in most states, this basic requisite of independent 
and impartial administration of the rule of law is imperiled. 
Where judges hold or retain office by election, the indepen-
dence of the judiciary is at risk. Elections encourage judges 
to raise campaign contributions and appeal to voters. They 
provide special interests with substantial opportunities to 
politicize judicial decisions and influence judicial behavior. 
Elected judges find it hard to avoid becoming entangled in 
the political thicket. Selection by election does not befit the 
role of a judge in our legal process. 
An alarming number of judicial elections have become po-
litically charged and divisive contests, characterized by in-
creasingly large campaign expenditures and interest group 
electioneering. In many instances, judicial campaigns have 
come to resemble those waged by partisan politicians, 
contests in which fundraising is considered a key to success 
and expensive television advertising the principal means 
of communicating with voters. Most of the money raised 
by judicial candidates comes from attorneys and parties 
who may later appear before them in court or who have a 
particular interest in the outcome of adjudications. Interest 
groups are also increasingly involved, sometimes spending 
more than the candidates themselves in hopes of influenc-
ing judicial decisions. Consequently, judicial elections 
are too often serving as arenas of conflict for competing 
interests who hope to elect judges whom they perceive to 
favor their views—or oust those who do not. 
Judicial elections are antithetical to the concept of an 
independent judiciary. The function of the judiciary is to 
apply and interpret law, not espouse the cause of a particu-
lar constituency or consider the electoral consequences 
of a ruling when making a decision. Our legal system is 
predicated on the idea that judges will serve as neutral and 
dispassionate arbiters and administrators, who treat all who 
come before them similarly and base their decisions solely 
on the law and the facts of the matter before them. This is 
the only means of guaranteeing that each case that comes 
before a court is decided through a principled deliberation 
with no predisposition as to the correct legal outcome. In 
this way, the exercise of judicial authority promotes respect 
for the law, thereby inspiring voluntary compliance with 
legal norms. 
The business community depends on the integrity and 
evenhandedness of the judicial system in making financial 
and investment decisions. An impartial judiciary is a 
critical element of a stable and prosperous business climate. 
As CED and its partner companies have noted elsewhere, 
“The belief among the American business community that 
justice is evenhanded affects economic decisionmaking, 
reduces the perception of risk, and encourages consistent 
adherence to transparent rules of law. The integrity of the 
American judicial system allows economic actors to rely on 
existing legal frameworks in weighing the potential costs 
and benefits of business and investment decisions.”2 Indeed, 
research analyses indicate that where private parties rea-
sonably expect that judges will enforce contracts and settle 
disputes impartially, transaction costs are lower, which 
in turn leads to a greater number of welfare-enhancing 
transactions.3
Accordingly, the business community is deeply concerned 
about the damaging effects of judicial elections on the 
independence and integrity of our state courts. The risk of 
donor interests and political pressures influencing judicial 
behavior is too great to ensure unbiased outcomes or to 
maintain public confidence in the fairness of the courts. In 
2007, CED commissioned a poll by Zogby International 
that found that four out of five business leaders worry that 
campaign contributions have a major effect on decisions 
rendered by judges.4 The survey also revealed near uni-
versal concern that campaign contributions and political 
pressure will make judges accountable to politicians and 
special interest groups rather than the law. The broader 
citizenry shares these doubts about the ability of judges 
to remain impartial. A 2009 USA Today-Gallup poll, for 
example, found that 89 percent of those surveyed believed 
that campaign contributions were problematic and could 
influence a judge’s rulings.5
Our concern about the effects of judicial elections is 
reflected in the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Institute for 
Legal Reform’s State Liability Rankings Study. Two-thirds 
(67 percent) of the businesses polled by the Chamber of 
Commerce reported that the litigation environment in a 
state is likely to impact important business decisions at 
their companies, including such basic decisions as where 
to locate and where to do business. This compared to 63 
percent who expressed this view in 2009 and 57 percent 
a year earlier.6 Not surprisingly, in the overall rankings 
of state litigation environments covering the period from 
2002-2010, seven of the eight states considered to have the 
worst litigation environments elect judges to office in the 
first instance, including four that hold partisan elections. 
Of the top eight states considered the best environments, 
only one holds contested elections for judges.
Business leaders are not alone in voicing such concerns. 
Judges themselves are warning of the consequences of 
current trends in judicial campaigning. In 2009, the 
Conference of Chief Justices, which represents 57 chief 
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justices from every state and U.S. territory, noted: “As 
judicial election campaigns become costlier and more 
politicized, public confidence in the fairness and integrity 
of the nation’s elected judges may be imperiled.”7 Former 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has also 
warned of a decline in public confidence in the impartiality 
of the courts. In her view, “This crisis of confidence in the 
judiciary is real and growing. Left unaddressed, the percep-
tion that justice is for sale will undermine the rule of law 
that the courts are supposed to uphold.”8
We are not surprised by these dire warnings. What we do 
find surprising is the lack of broader public outrage over 
the state of judicial elections. CED first began to highlight 
the deleterious effects of judicial elections more than a de-
cade ago and in 2002 issued a comprehensive study, Justice 
for Hire: Improving Judicial Selection, which urged reforms 
that would move away from judicial elections and towards 
merit-selection approaches.9 Since that time, judicial races 
have become more expensive and more polarized, a trend 
that will only be exacerbated by the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 
which permits unlimited corporate and labor union spend-
ing in judicial elections. The experience of recent elections 
and the prospects ahead demonstrate the urgent need for 
fundamental reform. 
Money in Judicial Elections
The vast majority of judges who preside in state courts are 
placed in office or remain in office by winning an election. 
In 38 states, most appellate and trial jurisdiction judges 
are either selected in the first instance by competing in a 
partisan or nonpartisan election, or are initially appointed 
to office and then required to stand for election after a 
specified term in order to retain office. In the past, these 
elections tended to be noncontroversial and candidates 
rarely faced a major challenge. But a transformation has 
taken place in judicial elections, resulting in costlier, more 
competitive, and more controversial campaigns. 
The flow of money in judicial elections has surged in the 
past decade, as candidates for the highest state courts 
raised larger and larger campaign war chests and interest 
groups poured increasingly large sums into judicial races. 
No longer a focal point of attention only for members of 
the trial bar, judicial elections in some states have become 
high-dollar battles waged by trial lawyers and unions, 
business groups and conservative organizations, party 
committees and PACs. Moreover, highly politicized and 
high-spending campaigns are spreading throughout the 
states, and appearing in retention elections or lower level 
judicial races in jurisdictions where judges on the ballot 
have issued opinions that a well-funded interest opposes. 
The result is an intensifying judicial arms race in which 
candidates face growing pressure to raise money and inter-
est groups are encouraged to mount campaigns in support 
of their preferred candidates. 
A recent report issued by Justice at Stake, Brennan Center 
for Justice, and National Institute on Money in State 
Politics, which represents the most comprehensive analysis 
of the financing of judicial elections to date, documented 
the growth in spending over the past decade.10 Their 
analysis revealed that spending in state supreme court 
elections more than doubled in the past decade, rising to 
a total of $206.9 million in the period from 2000-2009, as 
compared to $83.3 million in the period from 1990-1999. 
Since the 1998 election cycle, judicial candidates have 
raised substantial sums, with the total for each biennium 
ranging from $27 million to $46 million. Fundraising by 
judicial candidates has been most pronounced in partisan 
contests. From 2000-2009, candidates in the nine states that 
hold partisan elections raised $154 million in total, while 
candidates in the thirteen states that hold nonpartisan 
elections raised $51 million. 
Most of the money contributed to judicial contenders 
comes from trial attorneys and members of the business 
community. No other social or economic group matches 
the level of their donations. For example, in 2006, 88 
judicial candidates raised a total of $34 million. The 
National Institute on Money in State Politics has been able 
to identify the interests associated with 84 percent of these 
contributions. Of the $34 million total, 44 percent ($15.2 
million) came from business donors, while 21 percent ($7.4 
million) came from attorneys.11 The next largest identifi-
able sources of funding were the candidates themselves and 
political parties, with each responsible for about 4 percent 
of the monies raised. Small contributions from individuals 
accounted for only 2 percent ($681,000) of the money 
received by these candidates. 
Contributions from attorneys and members of the business 
community have been major sources of money in judicial 
campaigns for some time. Some state courts actually be-
came known publicly as favoring plaintiffs, the perceptions 
fueled by large campaign contributions to individual judges 
by members of the trial bar.12 After several years of such 
contributions, business interests began to fight back, led by 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and its state affiliates. As a 
result, members of the business community are responsible 
for a growing share of judicial campaign money, and, 
although lagging behind attorneys’ donations ten years ago, 
provided more than twice the sum contributed by members 
of the bar in 2006. 
Contributing money to candidates is only one way those 
with stakes in judicial elections attempt to influence 
outcomes. In recent years, interest groups and political 
parties have spent millions of dollars independently in 
support of the candidates of their choice. For example, in 
the 2007 and 2008 judicial races in Wisconsin, Wisconsin 
Manufacturers and Commerce, a business-backed orga-
nization, spent more than $2 million on television ads 
in judicial races. Greater Wisconsin Committee, a group 
backed by labor unions and the Democratic Party, took 
the other side in these contests and spent $1.4 million. In 
the Michigan Supreme Court race, the state Democratic 
Party spent $1.1 million on television advertising, while 
the Michigan Chamber of Commerce spent more than 
$800,000. In Alabama, the state Democratic Party gave 
more than $1.6 million to the Democratic candidate, while 
the Virginia-based Center for Individual Freedom spent 
more than $900,000 in support of the Republican candidate 
who narrowly won.13 
The flow of money in Alabama’s 2008 judicial race is worth 
noting, since it offers a troubling example of the influence 
partisan and special interest groups can exert in judicial 
elections. In this contest, 61 percent ($3.3 million) of all 
the contributions and expenditures made in the campaign 
($5.4 million) came from just four sources: Alabama 
Democratic Party (contributed $1.6 million), Center for 
Individual Freedom (spent $965,529), Alabama Civil 
Justice Reform Committee (contributed $434,079) and the 
Business Council of Alabama (contributed $275,200).14 
The effect such spending can have on the composition 
of courts was evident in the 2010 Iowa elections. Iowa 
Supreme Court justices are subject to periodic retention 
elections. These retention votes generally draw relatively 
little interest. Not in 2010. In 2009 the Iowa Supreme Court 
issued a unanimous decision allowing same-sex marriage, 
a ruling that provoked fierce opposition from groups who 
disagreed with the Court’s view. In 2010, three justices 
faced retention votes, and these elections became a light-
ning rod for interest group politicking. 
The justices declined to form campaign committees and 
spend money to urge a “Yes” vote, concerned about the 
perceptions that such efforts might promote with respect 
to future rulings. Not so for their interest group opponents, 
who launched major campaigns against them. Iowa for 
Freedom, a group supported by the Mississippi-based 
American Family Association, and the National Organiza-
tion for Marriage, a group based in Washington, D.C., 
spent more than $300,000 on television ads and other 
activities calling for removal of the three justices. Iowa for 
Freedom sponsored robo-calls to state voters, calling the 
election one of the “top 10” elections in the country and 
claiming that “Voting no on the retention of three Iowa 
Supreme Court justices will send a clear message that we 
are taking back control of our government from politi-
cal activist judges.” Another Washington-based political 
committee, Citizens United Political Victory Fund, targeted 
250,000 Iowans, urging them to vote “No” through a 
telephone call recorded by 2008 Republican presidential 
candidate Mike Huckabee that declared, “The last thing 
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this country and especially Iowans need are activist judges 
who put their own self interests ahead of the common 
good.” One member of Iowa’s congressional delegation 
even jumped into the fray, touring the state to tell citizens 
to vote “No.” As a result, all three justices were removed 
from office, making it the first time in Iowa history that a 
justice who stood for retention was defeated at the polls.15 
The 2011 Wisconsin Supreme Court race stands as 
another striking example of the political forces that can 
shape the dynamics of judicial contests. An incumbent 
justice seeking reelection, who was generally perceived to 
be a conservative, faced an opponent who was generally 
perceived as a liberal. The race took place in the context 
of a deeply divisive political battle within the state, which 
was spurred by the Republican governor’s effort to change 
the state’s collective bargaining provisions for state workers 
as part of a broader effort to balance the state’s budget. 
Collective bargaining reform was fiercely opposed by labor 
unions and Democratic legislators, and sparked weeks of 
public protests that drew national attention. The Supreme 
Court race became a proxy for this deeply divisive political 
battle, transforming what was expected to be a relatively 
easy reelection campaign for the sitting justice into a hotly 
contested, highly competitive campaign.16 The stakes 
were especially great, since any action changing collective 
bargaining rights was expected to be challenged in court. 
Consequently, interest groups on both sides poured 
millions of dollars into television advertising, with much 
of this advertising featuring negative attacks on the candi-
dates. The Greater Wisconsin Committee, a group backed 
by labor unions and Democrats, spent more than $1.3 
million in support of the challenger. The Issues Mobiliza-
tion Council of the Wisconsin Manufacturers and Com-
merce, a business-backed organization, spent more than 
$900,000 on advertising in support of the incumbent, who 
also benefited from a combined $1.3 million of advertising 
sponsored by three conservative groups. In total, inter-
est groups spent $3.6 million on advertising in the race, 
which was a record for a judicial race in Wisconsin.17 In 
the end, the incumbent was reelected by a narrow margin, 
but the results were so close that a recount of the vote was 
conducted. This added further to the politically charged 
atmosphere that enveloped the race. 
These examples are but a sample of the high-stakes battles 
that now take place in far too many judicial elections in 
far too many states. They document the conflicts of inter-
est and political influence inherent in the new politics of 
judicial elections. The message of these elections is clear: 
judges who wish to remain in office need be mindful of 
the political consequences of their rulings and should be 
wary of rendering decisions that are at odds with popular 
sentiment or challenge the views of special interests. Judges 
who fail to abide this message are likely to face reprisal at 
the polls. 
 It is little wonder that many Americans now believe that 
campaign contributions affect the outcomes in courtroom 
decisions—and that many judges concur with this view.18 
As former Supreme Court Justice O’Connor has observed, 
“In too many states, judicial elections are becoming politi-
cal prizefights where partisans and special interests seek to 
install judges who will answer to them instead of the law 
and the Constitution.”19
Caperton and Citizens United: Greater 
Spending, Greater Problems
An especially egregious example of donor influence was 
highlighted in the U.S. Supreme Court case, Caperton v. 
A.T. Massey Coal Company.20 In 2002, a West Virginia jury 
awarded $50 million to Hugh Caperton, owner of Harman 
coal mine, Harman Development Corporation, and other 
plaintiffs in a commercial dispute against Massey Coal. 
Massey appealed the verdict to West Virginia’s Supreme 
Court of Appeals. One of the justices who participated 
in the appeals decision and voted with the majority in a 
3-2 verdict to overturn the jury award was Justice Brent 
Benjamin. Justice Benjamin had rejected a recusal motion, 
despite the fact that he had received substantial campaign 
support from Don Blankenship, a Massey executive. In 
addition to contributing the maximum $1,000 directly 
to Benjamin’s campaign, Blankenship spent $500,000 on 
television advertisements and direct mailings. He also 
contributed $2.5 million to an independent political group, 
“And For The Sake Of The Kids,” which had targeted 
Benjamin’s opponent, an incumbent justice, for a ruling he 
had supported in a probation case. Benjamin defeated the 
incumbent in a close election. Blankenship’s $3 million to-
tal was more than the amount spent by all other Benjamin 
supporters and three times the amount spent by Benjamin’s 
own campaign committee. 
The question of whether the justice should have recused 
himself in this case as a matter of due process under 
federal constitutional law brought the case to the Supreme 
Court. In Caperton, the Court held that due process did 
require recusal. In rendering this decision, Justice Kennedy, 
writing for the majority, acknowledged the bias that can 
result from campaign spending: “[T]here is a serious risk 
of actual bias—based on objective and reasonable percep-
tions—when a person with a personal stake in a particular 
case had a significant and disproportionate influence in 
placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing 
the judge’s election campaign when the case was pend-
ing or imminent.”21 He further noted, “Just as no man is 
allowed to be judge in his own cause, similar fears of bias 
can arise when—without the consent of the other parties—
a man chooses the judge in his own cause. And applying 
this principle to the judicial election process, there was 
here a serious, objective risk of actual bias that required 
…recusal.”22 The Court, however, limited the reach of its 
ruling, noting that this was an “exceptional case” due to the 
relative size of Blankenship’s expenditures.23 
The Court’s subsequent decision in Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission will only serve to increase the 
risk of bias recognized by Justice Kennedy and enhance the 
role of money in judicial elections. In a highly controversial 
5-4 ruling, the Court declared that corporations (and by 
extension, labor unions) had the same right as individual 
citizens to spend money to advocate the election of candi-
dates, so long as the spending was done independently of 
a candidate. The Court thus overturned decades of federal 
and state campaign finance law by ruling that corpora-
tions could use their treasury funds to make independent 
campaign expenditures. In reaching this decision, the 
majority concluded that independent expenditures do not 
pose a risk of corruption because no money is exchanged 
with a candidate, so there can be no quid pro quo. The 
Court therefore held that the government was justified in 
prohibiting corporate contributions to candidates, but not 
corporate expenditures.
Taken together, Caperton and Citizens United increase the 
risk of judicial bias by making judicial contests a target 
of an even more intensive spending arms race. Before 
Citizens United, twenty-four states prohibited corporations 
from spending monies from their treasuries to support 
candidates, and two (Alabama and New York) limited the 
amounts that could be spent. States that have already be-
come judicial electoral battlegrounds, including Wisconsin, 
Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, were among the states 
that banned corporate spending. In these states, elections 
are likely to become even more costly and hard-fought. 
And other states that hold elections will increasingly follow 
suit, as well-funded interests will now be able to spend 
previously restricted funds advocating the candidates of 
their choice. 
Citizens United unleashed corporations, labor unions, and 
interest groups that receive corporate or labor funding. 
These organizations will be allowed to raise and spend 
unlimited sums in judicial contests without restrictions 
on their funding. This virtually ensures a sharp increase 
in spending. It will also add to the pressures placed on 
businesses and their executives to make contributions to 
organizations involved in judicial campaigning. The threat 
this poses to the independence and fairness of state judicial 
systems is severe. 
The decision in Caperton offers some hope of further 
litigation on the undue influence of money in judicial 
elections and stricter standards for recusal. Recusal resolves 
the problem of conflict of interest or bias that results from 
campaign donations, and is a remedy widely supported by 
the business community. The 2007 Zogby International 
survey conducted for CED found that 97 percent of the 
business leaders surveyed thought that judges should 
recuse themselves in cases involving parties who have 
contributed financially to their campaigns. 
Recusal provides an effective and necessary means of 
avoiding bias or conflict of interest in those cases that 
may involve a campaign donor. But it is a limited remedy. 
While it protects against the worst abuses, it fails to resolve 
the underlying problems that are inherent in a system of 
selection by election. 
A Business Agenda for Reform
Judicial independence is the cornerstone of fair, impartial 
and effective rule of law. An independent judiciary is an 
essential institution in a free society and necessary in a free 
market economy. But this ideal cannot be achieved when 
those who are entrusted to administer and protect the law 
are placed or remain in office by popular vote. 
No system of judicial election can insulate judges from 
the barbs of the political thicket. Elections are designed to 
infuse politics into the law, to make judges accountable to 
electoral politics, and to encourage judges to be mindful 
of the views of constituents other than the law. They cast 
judges in a political role, and provide outside interests 
with ample opportunities to politicize judicial actions and 
influence judicial behavior. 
Elections encourage citizens to view judges not as dispas-
sionate guardians of the law, but as politicians with robes. 
This image has been promoted not only by the activity that 
takes place in election campaigns, but also by the Supreme 
Court, which has issued opinions that have blurred the 
distinction between judges and elected representatives, and 
struck down key protections that had been established to 
limit the political and partisan behavior of judges. In this 
regard, we find the decision in Republican Party of Min-
nesota v. White to be particularly harmful.24 In this case, 
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional a canon 
of judicial conduct adopted by the Minnesota Supreme 
Court that prohibited a candidate for a judicial office from 
announcing his or her views on disputed legal or political 
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issues. This restriction was designed to safeguard against 
candidates announcing their positions on an issue before 
hearing or deciding a case. Yet the Court held that this 
protection did not serve to protect the impartiality of the 
judiciary and in a 5-4 ruling found this restriction to be in 
violation of the First Amendment. Following the Supreme 
Court decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit considered a number of other provisions of Minne-
sota’s code of judicial conduct and held that restrictions on 
partisan political activities, including soliciting campaign 
contributions through direct mail or appeals to large 
groups, were also unconstitutional.25 
The Supreme Court’s decision and the legal challenges to 
judicial codes of conducts or canons that have followed 
in its wake have seriously undermined the protections 
needed to limit the political behavior of judges. In our view, 
restrictions on the political activities of judges and other 
standards of conduct for election campaigns constitute 
necessary safeguards for preserving the independence and 
impartiality of the judiciary. We do not share the view of 
the majority in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White on 
the value of canons of conduct in judicial elections and 
hope that this issue will be reconsidered in a future case.
CED is deeply concerned about the effects elections have 
on the integrity of courts and the public’s confidence in 
the judicial process. We have concluded that appointment 
should be the basic principle that governs the selection 
of all judges. In our previous report on judicial elections, 
Justice for Hire, we set forth policy recommendations in 
accord with this principle. We continue to support these 
ideas. In particular, we strongly believe:
•	 All states should select judges through an appoint-
ment-based process. Specifically, states should adopt 
a commission-based appointment system without 
retention elections. In this approach, each state would 
establish a nonpartisan, independent judicial nominat-
ing commission that would be responsible for recruit-
ing, reviewing, and recommending eligible nominees 
for judicial office. All appointments to judicial 
positions would be made from the lists of candidates 
prepared by the commission.
•	 Any system of judicial selection must include ap-
propriate mechanisms for holding judges accountable 
for their performance in office. To facilitate periodic re-
view and evaluation of judges, we support the creation 
of judicial performance evaluation commissions, 
similar to those now found in some states. All judges 
should serve for a limited term of office. At the end of 
this term, an independent judicial performance evalu-
ation commission would conduct a comprehensive, 
objective review of a judge’s performance in office and 
prepare an evaluation report and a recommendation as 
to reappointment. This information would be provided 
to the governor or other appointing authority in a state 
for use in making a decision on reappointment. 
•	 Levels of compensation offered for judicial office can 
discourage highly qualified candidates from pursuing 
such service. State officials should review current 
salaries and ensure that appropriate levels of compen-
sation are provided to judges at all levels. One method 
of conducting compensation reviews is through the 
use of official compensation committees comparable to 
those already used in many states to determine judicial 
salaries.
We acknowledge that most states will find it politically 
impracticable to move to a commission-based appointment 
system in the near future.  A fully appointed judiciary 
requires a fundamental transformation of the judiciaries 
in most states.  For those states who do not adopt an 
appointive system, we prefer the use of merit selection as 
an alternative to selection by popular vote.  We prefer merit 
selection systems because they have the virtue of appoint-
ing judges in the first instance.  We regard appointment as 
the grounding principle of judicial selection. 
We also recognize that those states that currently hold 
elections are not likely to move to appointment-based 
approaches soon. Numerous bar associations, task forces, 
and judicial panels have called for reform of the judicial 
selection process and endorsed a move to appointment or 
merit-based systems. However, support for elections has 
remained strong; voters are not yet willing to relinquish 
their primary role in the selection process. 
Accordingly, CED supports changes that will not resolve 
the core problem of judicial elections, but will make a 
major contribution towards addressing their most deleteri-
ous effects. 
•	 Public financing should be established for judicial 
campaigns. We believe that public financing is the best 
available means of protecting the judicial process from 
the potentially corrupting effect of private donations. 
•	 Judges should not be selected in partisan elections in 
which candidates run under party labels. This method 
of selection encourages the electorate to view judges as 
partisan advocates and engenders substantial election-
eering by party organizations or their interest group 
allies on behalf of the party nominee.
•	 Lengthening terms is a necessary step to strengthen the 
caliber and independence of state courts. Judges should 
serve terms of office long enough to safeguard against 
a need to regularly seek reelection. As a general rule, 
the length of term for justices on the highest court in 
a state should be a minimum of twelve years and the 
term for trial and appellate court judges a minimum of 
eight years. Longer terms will provide a better balance 
between the principles of judicial independence and 
accountability than those commonly found in many 
current state systems. 
•	 States should establish judicial performance evaluation 
commissions, similar to those recommended for ap-
pointed judges. Commission evaluations can serve as a 
means of improving the information available to voters 
in states that hold elections. 
CED believes that evolving campaign tactics and the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Citizens United will 
make a bad system even worse in states that hold judicial 
elections. We urge public officials, members of the busi-
ness community, judges, members of the legal profession, 
and community leaders in the states to join in our efforts 
to increase public understanding of the importance of an 
independent judiciary and the consequences of judicial 
elections. We call upon these leaders to work together to 
initiate urgently needed reforms before the rule of law is 
further eroded by the perception that justice is for sale. 
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Memorandum of Dissent 
Roderick Hills
My  first objection is that the Policy and Impact Committee did not have an adequate opportunity to discuss the 
draft.  At our Committee meeting this Statement on judicial elections was by agreement to be split from the work 
on legislative elections.  There was no discussion of this draft.
My second objection is that the Statement does not sufficiently distinguish itself from our “Justice for Hire” 
Statement issued in 2002.  The failure to state clearly the differences in the two Statements makes it impossible to 
understand what  
has happened in 9 years that causes CED to change its recommendations.  
Third, the Statement makes little difference between retention elections (where a judge simply asks to be 
reappointed), contested elections where the judge runs against other candidates, and political elections where the 
party affiliation of the candidates is listed.
I also believe the Statement too easily accepts state funding of judicial elections as a satisfactory solution to the 
problem.   In “Justice for Hire” we also recommended public funding of elections.  However, two of our Trustees, 
Patrick Gross and Edmund Fitzgerald, objected to that recommendation: 
  
In the past 9 years we surely have learned even more about the problems of public funding of elections.     
 In “Justice for Hire” we suggested that the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts might be expanded to protect 
out of state defendants from the jurisdiction of judges who are overly dependent on lawyers or companies who 
have contributed to their reelection campaigns.  We could at the very least reconsider that issue.   In 2002 we called 
for a “broad public dialogue on the question of judicial selection.”  This new statement offers no new ideas.
I particularly object to the somewhat cavalier fashion in which the Statement calls for the overthrow of the 
Supreme Court’s decision, in the Minnesota case, that said a state court judge cannot be restricted from making 
public statements about matters that may come before his or her court.  A freedom of speech decision of such 
importance deserves far more respect.   We have a number of constitutional scholars who are CED Trustees.   They 
at least should have been given an opportunity to offer their views of the matter to our Committee.
Finally, much more attention should have been given to the use of professional rules or codes of conduct to 
disqualify judges who have received campaign help from a party before their court and to prohibit lawyers from 
appearing before judges to whom they have given significant financial support.
“But public funding would not address many of the shortcomings of judicial  
elections . . . : they may only be a crutch, one with severe implementation problems.  
This is a far less desirable outcome and we should hesitate to embrace it.”
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